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PROCESS AND OUTCOME
Introduction
Dunmore v Ontario (Attorney-General) has been identified as a demarcation point for the
interpretation of freedom of association.1 In overruling the long-established rule from
Hersees of Woodstock v Goldstein2 in RWDSU, Local 558 v Pepsi-Cola Canada Beverages
(West) Ltd,3 though, the Canadian Supreme Court signalled a willingness to depart
from past precedents. Ever since Health Services and Support—Facilities Subsector Bar-
gaining Association v British Columbia, where ‘the concept of freedom of association
[was interpreted as including the] notion of a procedural right to collective bargaining’,4
there has been debate regarding the content of the freedom of association pursuant to s 2
(d) of Canada’s Charter of Rights and Freedoms.5 Mounted Police Association of Ontario
v Canada (Attorney General),6 the focus here, supplemented the existing content of
freedom of association.
While Saskatchewan Federation of Labour v Saskatchewan7 remains the headline
decision for labour law in 2015, Mounted Police continued the elaboration of freedom
of association. Certainly Saskatchewan changed Canadian labour law textbooks: s 2(d)
of the Charter gives effect to a right to strike, thereby setting aside the interpretation
from 1987 that freedom of association was an individual right, accorded a limited
interpretation. Nevertheless, consider the legislation struck down. Through the Public
Service Essential Services Act,8 the provincial government granted itself unilateral auth-
ority to declare any public sector workers as ‘essential service employees’, prohibiting
1 2001 SCC 94 [Dunmore]. Bastarache J (for the majority) identified a purposive approach which recognised
connections and differences between the individual and the collective: ‘the law must recognize that certain
union activities—making collective representations to an employer, adopting a majority political platform,
federating with other unions—may be central to freedom of association even though they are inconcei-
vable on the individual level.’ This reasoning departed from that of Le Dain J (among others) who
denied collective bargaining was a fundamental right or freedom: Reference Re Public Service Employee
Relations Act (Alberta) [1987] 1 SCR 313 [Alberta Reference], 391.
2 (1963), 38 DLR (2d) 449 (ONCA) [Hersees].
3 2002 SCC 8.
4 Health Services and Support—Facilities Subsector Bargaining Assn v British Columbia 2007 SCC 27 [Health
Services], [66].
5 Canada Act 1982, c 11, Sch B (UK) [Charter].
6 2015 SCC 1 [Mounted Police]. The Royal Canadian Mounted Police (RCMP) is a national police force with
jurisdiction over matters crossing provincial borders. Where no other exists, it is also the local police force.
7 2015 SCC 4 [Saskatchewan].
8 SS 2008, c P-42.2. The Trade Union Amendment Act 2008, SS 2008, c 26 was found to comply with the
Charter, a matter returned to later.
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them from participating in strike action. The Act contained no meaningful mechanism
for resolving bargaining impasses.9 Moreover, the identification of essential service
employees was even beyond adjudication by a labour relations board. Given the scope
of the legislation, surprise would have been slight that such a one-sided statute was
found to have violated s 2(d). Instead, Mounted Police provided some further direction
as to the content of a ‘meaningful pursuit of workplace goals’. The guidance can be cate-
gorised in terms of process and outcome where the former constitutes the content of
freedom of association and the latter is viewed as sitting outside the right.
The Decision to Reverse a Recent Precedent
In the opening of Mounted Police, Chief Justice McLachlin and Lebel J (for the 6:1
majority) outlined this lengthy decision:
whether excluding members of the Royal Canadian Mounted Police (‘RCMP’) from col-
lective bargaining[10]… and imposing a non-unionized labour relations regime violates
the guarantee of freedom of association in… the Canadian Charter of Rights and Free-
doms. This requires us to review the nature and interpretation of the right… and to
clarify the scope of the constitutional protection of collective bargaining [as outlined
in the Court’s recent decisions on s.2(d) of the Charter.]11
Long prohibited from unionising12 (even in the midst of significant unionisation
amongst Canadian public sector workers in the 1960s),13 RCMP members were
barred from collective bargaining due to concerns over ‘loyalty and obedience’.14
While the decision to prohibit prevailed, it was not a unanimous sentiment at the
time.15 RCMP members were subsequently placed under their own labour relations
regime. Voluntary associations of RCMP members formed at their own initiative (con-
sisting of the Mounted Police Associations of Ontario, British Columbia and Quebec;
the two former initiated this case). These three associations offered many services
akin to those of the standard union such as advice and assistance pertaining to discipline
and grievances, political lobbying and education. Unlike most unions, these associations
had no full-time staff nor were they recognised for collective bargaining purposes.
Members could raise their workplace issues through the Staff Relations Representative
9 Saskatchewan (n 7) [89]–[90].
10 Pursuant to the Public Service Labour Relations Act as enacted by the Public Service Modernization Act,
SC 2003, c 22, s 2.
11 Mounted Police (n 6) [1]. References omitted.
12 Between 1918 and 1974, members were prohibited from engaging in all associational activities pursuant to
Orders in Council PC 1918-2213 and later PC 174/1981 (1945).
13 With the adoption of the Public Service Staff Relations Act, SC 1966–67, c 72.
14 Mounted Police (n 6) [18].
15 While the Report of the Preparatory Committee on Collective Bargaining in the Public Service (Queen’s
Printer 1965) recommended excluding RCMP members, another report, Canadian Industrial Relations:
The Report of the Task Force on Labour Relations (Privy Council Office 1968), suggested federal law enfor-
cement officials have the right, subject to limitations.
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Program (SRRP), but pay considerations were advanced through a separate process
called the RCMP Pay Council. A third aspect of the system, the Mounted Police
Members’ Legal Fund (funded through membership dues) provided legal assistance to
members relating to workplace issues.16 Of note, in 1999, the Supreme Court of
Canada considered the exclusion of RCMP members from collective bargaining in
Delisle v Canada (Attorney-General).17 The Court then found no infringement of
members’ freedom of association.18
Distinguishing Delisle, the Supreme Court in 2015 found a violation of members’
Charter rights attributable to the existing labour relations system denying members ‘a
degree of choice and independence sufficient to enable them to determine and pursue
their collective interests’ as well as precluding a process independent from ‘manage-
ment’s influence’.19 Choice involved accountability: where members selected their
representatives to work towards collective interests.20 Independence reinforced the
nexus between members’ interests and the activities of the association.21 The majority
offered two reasons as to why the matter was not engaged in 1999. First, Delisle predated
the shift towards a purposive approach to s 2(d) promulgated by BC Health and Ontario
(Attorney-General) v Fraser.22 Second, Delisle scrutinised only a portion of the labour
relations system, whereas in Mounted Police the entire labour relations framework was
challenged.23 These bases may leave some dissatisfied with the explanation.24 Still,
Mounted Police added to the conversation by asserting the importance of choice and
independence in selecting collective interests as a union.
In the most recent labour law decisions of the Supreme Court, Justice Rothstein
(retired as of 30 August 2015) has commonly written in dissent and in Mounted
Police he continued his opposition. Rothstein J has consistently questioned the majority’s
rendering of the renovated freedom of association. In this function, his remarks are
important contributions. In Mounted Police, the kernel of Rothstein J’s criticism—
that the majority constitutionalised the Wagner Act model of labour relations25—
leads to a noteworthy consideration: have the revised parameters of the process effected
a particular outcome? Rothstein J asserted that RCMP members operated within a
labour relations system which gave effect to their s 2(d) rights. Recalling Fraser which
16 The SRRP and the Legal Fund satisfied the Ontario Court of Appeal, in part, that RCMP members could
effect collective workplace goals: Mounted Police Association of Ontario v Canada (Attorney General) 2012
ONCA 363 [Mounted Police (ONCA)], [128].
17 [1999] 2 SCR 989 [Delisle].
18 A further review (The SRR Challenge 2000 Review) arose soon afterwards. Although it brought about
changes, limitations remained.
19 Mounted Police (n 6) [5], [97].
20 Mounted Police (n 6) [87].
21 Ibid [88].
22 Ibid [125]. 2011 SCC 20 [Fraser].
23 Ibid [126].
24 The Ontario Court of Appeal considered the matter ‘disposed’ by the Supreme Court of Canada in Delisle:
Mounted Police (ONCA) (n 16) [127].
25 Mounted Police (n 6) [165].
12 Analysis
acknowledged differing labour relations systems outside the Wagner Act model, he
characterised the SRRP as avoiding ‘the adversarial, Wagner model of labour relations
prevalent in much labour legislation in Canada’.26
Throughout his labour law opinions, Justice Rothstein valued deference to the leg-
islative branch, particularly with regard to socio-economic policy27 which he submitted
required flexibility because court decisions may ‘expand Charter rights in such a way as
to prevent governments from responding to new information or changing social and
economic conditions’.28 This meant courts should not trench upon labour law but
instead ‘must respect that concerns such as maintaining “the balance between employees
and employer” and attaining “equilibrium” in labour relations… fall within the proper
role and expertise of governments and legislatures, not the judiciary’.29 A response to the
deference argument was not as plainly put in Mounted Police as it was by Justice Abella
(for the 5:2 majority) in the later decision of Saskatchewan: ‘If the touchstone of Charter
compliance is deference, what is the point of judicial scrutiny?’30
Refining Freedom of Association
Mounted Police served as an opportunity for explication on some matters. Looking back
to the Health Services decision, the right may have been viewed as derivative insofar as
collective bargaining was the ‘most significant collective activity through which
freedom of association [may be] expressed in the labour context’.31 The majority in
Mounted Police clarified: freedom of association ‘is not a derivative of… other rights.
It stands as an independent right with independent content, essential to the development
and maintenance of the vibrant civil society upon which our democracy rests.’32 The
Court continued to rely on the purposive analysis of the right which it defined as requir-
ing ‘courts to consider the most concrete purpose or set of purposes that underline[d]
the right or freedom in question’.33 Drawing on Dickson CJ’s dissent in the Alberta
Reference, the Court’s purposive analysis as applied to s 2(d) and labour relations was
one of power imbalance:34
Freedom of association is most essential in those circumstances where the individual is
liable to be prejudiced by the actions of some larger and more powerful entity, like the
government or an employer. Association has always been the means through which political,
cultural and racial minorities, religious groups and workers have sought to attain their pur-
poses and fulfil their aspirations; it has enabled those who would otherwise be vulnerable and
26 Ibid [164].
27 Ibid [161].
28 Ibid.
29 Ibid [162].
30 Saskatchewan (n 7) [76].
31 Health Services (n 4) [66]. See also Fraser (n 22) [46].
32 Mounted Police (n 6) [49].
33 Ibid [50].
34 Ibid [59]. The Court also referred to this as ‘social imbalance’.
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ineffective to meet on more equal terms the power and strength of those with whom their
interests interact and, perhaps, conflict.35
And so, three classes of activity were identified for s 2(d) protection: ‘(1) the right to
join with others and form associations; (2) the right to join with others in the pursuit of
other constitutional rights; and (3) the right to join with others to meet on more equal
terms the power and strength of other groups or entities.’36
Another difficulty the Supreme Court addressed in Mounted Police was the test for
infringement: specifically, what was ‘effective impossibility’.37 In rejecting RCMP offi-
cers’ claim, the Ontario Court of Appeal relied upon the Supreme Court in Fraser for
its interpretation of the right;38 namely that a Wagner Act model has not been ‘consti-
tutionalized’.39 The Ontario court concluded that (unlike RCMP labour relations) only
where law or government action rendered achieving collective goals ‘effectively imposs-
ible’ for workers would there be a violation of s 2(d).40 Refining the test in Mounted
Police, the premise remained the balance in labour relations between workers pursuing
workplace goals and (presumably though it is not explicitly stated) employers’ focus on
the business interests of the undertaking. Within this context, ‘the ultimate question to be
determined is whether the measures disrupt the balance between employees and employer
that s. 2(d) seeks to achieve, so as to substantially interfere with meaningful collective bar-
gaining… ’.41 Underlying the notion of disrupting the balance was the idea of power
imbalance that has historically been developed in labour relations.42 The dual purpose
of the freedom of association was ‘to prevent individuals, who alone may be powerless,
from being overwhelmed by more powerful entities, while also enhancing their strength
through the exercise of collective power’.43
Freedom of Association as a Process
Canadian courts remain empowered to enforce Charter principles and it has been from
this premise the Supreme Court has based its reasoning. The departure from the 1980s
line of authority established in Dunmore44 was grounded in the ‘full range of associa-
tional activity’ contemplated by the Charter as well as the meaning given to freedom
of association by international documents Canada had ratified.45
35 Alberta Reference (n 1) 365–66; cited in Mounted Police (n 6) [57] (emphasis added in Mounted Police).
36 Mounted Police (n 6) [66].
37 Ibid [74]–[76].
38 Mounted Police (ONCA) (n 16) [109], [111].
39 Ibid [91]; Fraser (n 22) [44]–[45].
40 Mounted Police (ONCA) (n 16) [111].
41 Mounted Police (n 6) [72] (emphasis in original). Applied in Saskatchewan (n 7) [77].
42 Ibid (n 6) [68].
43 Ibid (n 6) [70].
44 Dunmore (n 1) [30].
45 C087—Freedom of Association and Protection of the Right to Organise Convention, 1948 (No 87) (entry
into force: 4 July 1948; ratified by Canada: 23 March 1972).
14 Analysis
Criticism of the twenty-first-century freedom of association decisions from Canada’s
highest court has centred on the term ‘constitutionalising’: linking constitutional rights
with the labour relations legal apparatus.46 Specifically, constitutionalising labour rights
has been characterised as part of the ‘much more pervasive global constitutionalization
that characterizes our contemporary world’. Continuing her assessment, Professor
Fudge defined global constitutionalism as precipitating ‘a shift in law’s legitimacy from
constituent power, the will of the people, and democracy to rights in which “courts are
the hinge elements in the emergence of a comprehensive transnational constitutionalism,
which integrates and systematically consolidates political institutions operating in the
national, supranational and transnational domains of global society”.47 Mounted Police
further exemplified how ‘political actors exercise and legitimate their power’.48
Comparison amongst differing labour relations frameworks inevitably leads to ques-
tions. A prescient query within this discussion (how does the Supreme Court in Fraser fit
withMounted Police?) is one with some history to it. InDunmore, Bastarache J ruled that,
as compared to RCMP officers in Delisle,49 Ontario agricultural workers were not ‘strong
enough to look after [their] interests without collective bargaining legislation’ and for
this reason the impugned legislation violated agricultural workers’ freedom of associ-
ation. With Fraser, the Agricultural Employees Protection Act 200250 was found to
provide for a s 2(d) compliant framework permitting collective representations concern-
ing terms and conditions of work to be made to an agricultural employer (though main-
taining the exclusion from Ontario’s labour relations legislation)51 and requiring that
employer to listen to or read representations.52 Fraser has been characterised as a
‘retreat’53 (as well as a ‘hiatus’)54 because the statute protected only a right to make rep-
resentations. The provision teetered at the ‘weaker end’ of the scale of trade union
activity because representation alone has been a diluted form of action.55 To distinguish
amongst different labour relations processes in Mounted Police, the Wagner Act model
was identified as ‘one example of how the requirements of choice and independence
ensure meaningful collective bargaining’.56 The threshold to be met in that case was
46 Thoroughly discussed in R Dukes, The Labour Constitution: The Enduring Idea of Labour Law (OUP 2014).
47 J Fudge, ‘Constitutionalizing Labour Rights in Canada and Europe: Freedom of Association, Collective
Bargaining and Strikes’ (2015) 68 Current Legal Problems 267 [Fudge], 269.
48 Ibid 275.
49 Dunmore (n 1) [41] referring to the words used in Canadian Industrial Relations: The Report of the Task
Force on Labour Relations (Privy Council Office 1968), [253]–[254] as well as Bastarache J’s decision in
Delisle (n 17) [31] when he wrote of RCMP officers’ strength to form employee associations despite
their exclusion from the relevant legislation.
50 SO 2002, c 16 [AEPA].
51 Labour Relations Act 1995, SO 1995, c 1, Sch A, s 3(b 1) as amended by the AEPA, s 18.
52 AEPA (n 50) s 5(6).
53 A Bogg and K Ewing, ‘A (Muted) Voice at Work? Collective Bargaining in the Supreme Court of Canada’
(2011–12) 33 Comparative Labor Law and Policy Journal 379 [Bogg and Ewing], 379.
54 Fudge (n 47) 284.
55 Bogg and Ewing (n 53) 385.
56 Mounted Police (n 6) [94].
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for employees to retain sufficient choice over workplace goals and adequate indepen-
dence from management to ensure meaningful collective bargaining. In this context,
these are understandable additions to the interpretation of s 2(d) insofar as it clarified
the content of a meaningful pursuit of workplace goals. Situated within the line of
recent decisions, however, difficulties arise.
Writing to the point of differing models, the Court identified Ontario’s School
Boards Collective Bargaining Act 201457 as another regime (‘designated bargaining
model’ where members’ bargaining agent ‘is designated [by statute] rather than
chosen by the employees’).58 Ontario teachers are a rich (and enduring) source of
labour law discussion. Since the release of Mounted Police, the Ontario teachers’ col-
lective bargaining framework has become more complicated. In October 2015, a
media investigation revealed that since the Ontario Government changed the collective
bargaining system for Ontario teachers (after 2003), it had been reimbursing teachers’
unions for their expenses during rounds of collective bargaining.59 Critics of the
Supreme Court’s line of freedom of association decisions may rely on the reimburse-
ment situation to, for example, argue the power imbalance against workers has been
overstated. Moreover, the instance recalled the debate regarding public sector
unions and their involvement in politics. One view held that public sector unions
have a disproportionate influence on the political process to the point that distortions
will arise if not held in check.60 Another perspective reflected on the more singular cir-
cumstances of public sector labour relations insofar as commercial influences (as
found in the private sector) are replaced by political, suggesting the political is the
venue for this form of labour relations.61
The reference to the School Boards Collective Bargaining Act 2014 raised another
side to the threshold of sufficiency of choice and independence over workplace goals.
Ontario teachers’ collective bargaining had been conducted between the local unit of
the relevant union and the local school board. The 2014 Act bifurcated the process so
57 SO 2014, c 5.
58 Mounted Police (n 6) [95].
59 ‘Ontario Government’s Payments to Teachers Unions Tops $3.7 Million’ <www.theglobeandmail.com/
news/national/ontario-premier-wynne-delivers-ultimatum-to-elementary-teachers/article26950978/>
accessed 5 February 2016.
60 R Clark Jr, ‘Politics and Public Employee Unionism: Some Recommendations for an Emerging Problem’
(1975) 44 University of Cincinnati Law Review 680, 680: ‘collective bargaining in the public sector must
take place in a political environment.… too little attention has been paid to the political aspects of
public sector collective bargaining and the potential problems and distortions of the political process
that will result if remedies are not instituted’.
61 S Fredman and GS Morris, The State as Employer: Labour Law in the Public Services (Mansell 1989) 7–8:
‘the government derives the revenue to pay its employees primarily from taxation and… this allows gov-
ernments when dealing with their employees to override commercial concerns in favour of political and
macroeconomic factors. This has a particularly important impact on the role of industrial action in the
public services. It is unusual for industrial action to have a substantial financial effect on government.
Instead, trade unions rely on the political pressure which may result from the disruption in services to
the public. However, governments may decide to ignore whatever political pressure is generated and with-
stand a strike if such a strategy is deemed to be politically desirable.’
16 Analysis
that ‘central’ and ‘local’ bargaining takes place. Pre-eminent was the scope of bargaining
at the ‘central’ level,62 as there has been no provision outlining the content of local bar-
gaining. Finally, the current influence of Ontario teachers’ unions raised a question as to
what the Supreme Court may have endorsed by using them as a reference. Relations
between teacher unions and school boards became increasingly acrimonious between
1969 and 1975.63 Labour unrest amongst teachers steadily increased to the point that
in the mid-1970s the situation reached impasse. Strike action being unlawful, teachers
employed the only remaining substitute, mass resignations.64 Though reluctant to inter-
vene, the Ontario Government established a statutory labour relations framework exclu-
sive to public sector education, the School Boards and Teachers’ Collective Negotiations
Act.65 The School Boards Collective Bargaining Act 2014 stands as the latest version of
the 1970s example. The chances of another cohort (such as agricultural workers) effect-
ing a similar response would be slight. The question then is where there has been a weak
history of collective pursuit of common workplace goals there will be a lower threshold
for meeting the standard of a meaningful process, than a situation where there has been a
framework of labour relations born out of a history of industrial conflict where a strong
union (or unions) has emerged.
Scope for a Government-Directed Outcome
The opinion inMounted Police suggested scope for steering a process without effecting a
particular outcome. Between process and outcome, government can affect a labour
relations system.
In Mounted Police, the majority refined the basis for enforcement: first, there must
be disruption to the balance between employees and employers; and second, this disrup-
tion must substantially interfere with meaningful collective bargaining.66 These points
were referenced to Health Services67 which relied upon Bastarache J’s ruling in
Dunmore.68 This benchmark (which the Mounted Police majority viewed as the proper
construction instead of its earlier formulation of ‘effective impossibility’) recalibrated
the interaction between workers (through union representation) and their employers.69
The majority perceived a need for reassessment that reduced imbalances.70 Mounted
Police left open the scope beyond the process of selection of representatives and the
62 Sections 24 and 28.
63 BM Downie, Collective Bargaining and Conflict Resolution in Education: The Evolution of Public Policy in
Ontario (Industrial Relations Centre Queen’s University 1978) 6.
64 There had been fairly significant success in this tactic: S Lawton, G Bedard, D MacLellan and X Li, Tea-
chers’ Unions in Canada (Detselig Enterprises Ltd 1999) 31.
65 SO 1975, c 72; repealed by Education Quality Improvement Act, SO 1997, c 31.
66 Mounted Police (n 6) [72].
67 Health Services (n 4) [90].
68 Dunmore (n 1) [16], [23].
69 ‘Strengthen’ would be a debatable term (as others noted herein have done); considering that the power to
assess labour relations systems more clearly rests with the courts.
70 Mounted Police (n 6) [59].
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collective interests pursued. It omitted guidance on the apparatus of labour relations,
particularly the expanse between interference and substantial interference. It is this
area that remains relatively uncharted, except to the point that the guide through the
terrain has been identified as the court.
Released on the same day, Meredith v Canada (Attorney General)71 fits within this
discussion. Against the backdrop of the Great Recession, the plaintiff RCMP members
of the National Executive Committee of the Staff Relations Representative Program chal-
lenged, pursuant to s 2(d), both the (December 2008) decision of the Treasury Board as
well as the Expenditure Restraint Act72 which imposed a limit of 1.5 per cent on wage
increases in the public sector for the 2008 to 2010 fiscal years. The legislation contained
an exception for RCMP members, permitting them the opportunity to negotiate
additional allowances (an opportunity that was taken up resulting in ‘significant
benefits’).73 The challenge did not extend to the constitutionality of the RCMP labour
relations process. The majority of the Supreme Court (Abella J dissenting) ruled that
rolling back wages without consultation did not violate s 2(d) of the Charter because
‘the level at which the ERA capped wage increases for members of the RCMP was con-
sistent with the going rate reached in agreements concluded with other bargaining agents
inside and outside of the core public administration and so reflected an outcome con-
sistent with actual bargaining processes’.74 It was striking that a costs order was made
against the RCMP members considering Abella J’s dissent: ‘The absence of any real
opportunity to make representations about the extent and impact of the rollbacks
before they were approved by Treasury Board had the effect of completely nullifying
the right to a meaningful consultation process and thereby denied members their s. 2
(d) Charter rights.… [bearing in mind that] almost every other bargaining agent in
the core public service was consulted.’75 It remains unclear if anything can be drawn
from the labour relations system in Mounted Police being found deficient under s 2
(d), whilst a facet of that system was upheld in Meredith.
The questions from Meredith were later engaged to some extent in Saskatchewan
with respect to the Supreme Court’s upholding of the Trade Union Amendment Act
2008. Several provisions narrowed the parameters for certification: increasing the level
of written support from 25 per cent to 45 per cent for certification; reducing from six
to three months the time period for receiving such support; eliminating automatic cer-
tification where over 50 per cent of employees have provided written support; excluding
an employer’s communication (regarding facts and opinions) with workers during a cer-
tification drive from the scope of an unfair labour practice. Adding a certain amount of
pressure to unions, decertification could be achieved with the written support of 45 per
cent of membership (down from 50 per cent). While these changes were found ‘not [to]
71 2015 SCC 2 [Meredith].
72 SC 2009, c 2 [ERA].
73 Meredith (n 71) [29].
74 Ibid [28].
75 Ibid [50].
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substantially interfere with the freedom to freely create or join associations’,76 these types
of amendments are rarely (if ever) put forward to better facilitate freedom of association.
Though utilising international documents to ground its decisions in the area,77 the
Supreme Court also laid down a clear distinction: it would not go so far as ILO
bodies in interpreting the mechanisms for protection of freedom of association.78 Fur-
thermore, the highest court would also permit government-initiated changes to the
labour relations system that could interfere with freedom of association.
With this in mind, while the Labour Trilogy of the 1980s has been reconsidered,
these decisions retain pertinence in some respect. Consider McIntyre J’s explication of
labour law as ‘based upon a political and economic compromise between organized
labour—a very powerful socio-economic force—on the one hand, and the employers
of labour—an equally powerful socio-economic force—on the other’.79 Here was a
mixture of the pre-Dunmore perspective with a consideration persisting through to
the current purposive approach to freedom of association. An imbalance between
labour and employing entities grounded (in part) the purposive approach and so a
departure from the Alberta Reference was discernible. However, the notion of balance
remains. With the recent decisions, this rests more with the legislative branch. The
facts of the twenty-first-century labour decisions each spoke of degree within the
process: the BC Government was required to consult with public sector unions
(Health Services); a non-Wagner Act system may be a sufficient framework for
workers to make representations (Fraser); the unilateral power a government vested
in itself to determine what constituted essential services (including the absence of any
framework for review by a labour board) failed to meet a minimum threshold for s 2
(d) (Saskatchewan); a labour relations systemmust have ‘a degree of choice and indepen-
dence sufficient to enable [members] to determine and pursue their collective inter-
ests’.80 Beyond these thresholds, the notion of balance has not been meaningfully
engaged, thereby leaving open the question of to what extent Canadian courts will inter-
vene in the details of a labour relations system. The Canadian Supreme Court has set out
some of the elements of freedom of association, but it has left scope for political and
economic compromise, providing for a spectrum of conduct for government. The
fact of establishing these requirements of degree is not diminished here for it does set
a new floor of protection in s 2(d). However, the facts of the decisions since Dunmore
have not provided for consideration beyond. A difficulty raised by Mounted Police has
been discerning what constitutes balance. Consider the following.
76 Saskatchewan (n 7) [100]. Abella J also noted the trial judge’s assessment that these ‘requirements [were]
not an excessively difficult threshold’.
77 Saskatchewan was called the ‘high water mark’ for the Court’s ‘embrace of international labour rights as a
basis for interpreting of the Charter’s protection’: Fudge (n 47) 284.
78 Professor Fudge further suggested that this ‘interpretive technique allows the Court to preserve its exclu-
sive jurisdiction… to determine the constitutionality of legislation or government action’: Fudge (n 47)
286.
79 Alberta Reference (n 1) 414.
80 Mounted Police (n 6) [5].
King’s Law Journal 19
(a) Time limits for the process
Underlining the developing nature of this area, the consequential effects of the Supreme
Court’s reading of s 2(d) remain to be considered. One such matter is the time period for
a meaningful collective bargaining process in pursuit of employees’ goals. Take the
example of reinstatement of a striking worker to her original position after the end of
strike action. In the province of Ontario, s 80 of the Labour Relations Act 1995 contem-
plated a six-month (continuous) period for lawful strike action; for workers must make
an ‘unconditional application in writing’ for reinstatement within six months of the
commencement of the strike action. Would this provision disrupt the ‘balance necessary
to ensure the meaningful pursuit of workplace goals’ or would it be constitutional under
s 2(d)? If the latter, does the six-month period suggest a timeline for a meaningful col-
lective bargaining process? On the issue, other provinces do not have a similar timeline.
Alberta’s Labour Relations Code,81 s 90, provided for a two-year period from the com-
mencement of a strike or lockout and did not require a settlement for reinstatement to
occur. Manitoba’s Labour Relations Act,82 ss 11–13, did not expressly state any timeline.
(b) Imposing a labour relations framework
Professor Ewing argued that one result of compliance by the state with its obligations in
international law is that back-to-work legislation ‘would have to be confined to sectors
which are essential services “in the strict sense of the term” in the way that term is
defined by the ILO supervisory bodies’.83 On this point, in December 2015, several
Ontario public school teacher and staff unions challenged the means by which a col-
lective agreement was reached in 2012, alleging the government had violated their
Charter rights.84 Once the government had negotiated an agreement with the Catho-
lic teachers union, it sought to establish the same terms and conditions with the
remaining three teachers unions through the Putting Students First Act 201285
which contained provisions explicitly enforcing these same parameters. The
Charter challenge asserted, in part, that collective bargaining had been predeter-
mined by this tactic. With the Act’s adoption on ‘an exceptional and temporary
81 SA 2000 c L-1.
82 CCSM c L10.
83 KD Ewing, ‘“The Lady Doth Protest Too Much, Methinks”: The Right to Strike, International Standards
and the Supreme Court of Canada’ (2014–15) 18 Canadian Labour and Employment Law Journal 518, 549.
84 ‘Teachers’ Unions Launch Court Fight Over Despised Anti-Strike Bill’ <www.thestar.com/yourtoronto/
education/2015/12/14/teachers-unions-launch-court-fight-over-despised-anti-strike-bill.html> accessed
5 February 2016.
85 SO 2012, c 11 (Royal Assent: 11 September 2012). The Act was repealed 23 January 2013: <http://news.
ontario.ca/edu/en/2013/01/ontario-to-repeal-putting-students-first.html?utm_source=ondemand&utm_
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basis’,86 this litigation focused not only on the process of freedom of association but
also on a government’s capacity to achieve an outcome (to ‘protect the Government’s
initiatives for students and preserve jobs’ (as the Act’s Preamble stated)) within the
parameters of a purposive approach to s 2(d).
Conclusion
The focus of the present work has been to underline, first, that Mounted Police is
part of an ongoing consideration of the protection afforded to freedom of associ-
ation by the Charter. Second, the points made here are intended to contribute to
that discussion by noting certain matters for further clarification. Carrying on
from the labour law decisions of 2015, Canadian labour law continues to deliberate
upon important queries. The question of constitutionalising labour rights con-
tinues, as do the concerns that such a movement diminishes the political efforts
of unions to effect change for workers or that the courts will prevail over the
experts, thereby leaving a dysfunctional legislative scheme.87 For workers, the
legal avenue and the political strategy have been pursued concurrently for some
time. It is only more recently, after many years of litigation, that the legal route
has borne some measure of success.
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